Evolution, experience and challenges
The first national independent fiscal institution entrusted with real-time surveillance of public finances (the United States Congressional Budget Office) was established in unique historical circumstances -almost accidentally -more than three decades ago.
A couple of older institutions (the Central Planning Bureau in the Netherlands and the High
Council of Finance in Belgium) began a similar fiscal watchdog function later and, eventually, a few other countries followed. More recently, in response to an unprecedented buildup in public sector indebtedness in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, an increasing number of countries have created, or are in the process of establishing, independent fiscal institutions.
These watchdogs differ markedly from other independent institutions that may have monitoring responsibilities too. In particular, they are not to be mistaken for public audit institutions that operate, with a long tradition, in more than 150 countries around the world. Although equally independent, the audit institution is responsible for conducting a detailed ex post inspection of the physical, financial and legal integrity of every public sector entity; in some countries, this task is complemented with performance audits. By contrast, the principal function of an independent fiscal institution (known under various names such as fiscal council, parliamentary budget office, or office for budget responsibility) is analysis and assessment of the budget bill or of any other legislative proposal in the fiscal area, including its consistency with fiscal rules (if any), prior to enactment. More specifically, an independent fiscal institution performs real-time costing and forecasting to ascertain the macro-fiscal consequences of the budget bill, over a short and medium term to a long-term horizon. In essence, its principal raison d'être is to maintain discipline and transparency in public finances during the policy-making process, which in turn helps bolster the credibility of government.
In other words, whereas the public audit institution discharges an indispensable backward-looking task, the independent fiscal institution has a forward-looking diagnostic task. In this division of complementary responsibilities, the former is comprised of a large number of lawyers, auditors and accountants, whereas the latter is for the most part staffed with a relatively small group of economists. However, both institutions serve primarily the legislature and the public at large. Although in principle neither institution has a normative role, exceptionally in a few countries the independent fiscal institution has an advisory function (Sweden) or recommends budgetary targets (Belgium), but at the risk of forsaking non-partisanship.
In any case, the independent fiscal institution has no decision-making authority and, by implication, it cannot have legally binding enforcement power. Unlike monetary policy, fiscal policy by its very nature cannot be outsourced for two reasons. First, whereas monetary policy is assigned only the price stability goal, fiscal policy serves multiple objectives: stabilisation, allocative, distributional goals. Second, a democratically elected government cannot entrust fiscal policy to an unelected independent authority. By contrast, in most countries around the world, monetary policy is delegated to an independent monetary authority (monetary council, federal open market committee, etc.) predicated on a well-defined principal-agent relationship between the government and the monetary authority.
Moreover, the independent fiscal institution is to be distinguished from other advisory bodies, whether independent (Austria, Denmark, Germany) or attached to the executive arm of the government (for example, the United States Council of Economic Advisors), that do not perform a technical oversight function. Although accountable to the legislature, the independent fiscal institution is not part of it -not in the way that a budget or treasury committee is part of Parliament. The independent fiscal institution is a permanent entity, unlike periodically established review entities (finance commissions in India). Also, such an institution has a broad mandate mainly over the central government, as distinguished from a narrow monitoring task (United States Trustees of the Social Security and Medicare trust funds). 1 In all, there are more than half a dozen countries with independent fiscal institutions that meet the above characteristics. Yet, in each case there are features that are specific to each country's needs, legal traditions and initial historical context at the time of establishment. These features, of course, evolve over time, as the institution acquires experience.
As regards its organisational structure, the institution is headed either by an individual or by a council (or committee), appointed by the government or elected by a legislative committee or the legislature as a whole. More important, the system of government usually determines the institution's independence. While in a parliamentary system the institution should be independent from both the executive and the legislature, in a presidential system it is usually sufficient if the institution is independent from the executive. 2 Typically, the head is a remunerated professional with no active political affiliation, who serves for a predetermined period spanning beyond the term of the government. 3 In most cases, the institution has its own technical staff, with full access to all necessary data and information from the government. However, in Belgium and Sweden, it is supported by the staff of other public institutions 4 with proven impartiality and analytical competence.
The terms of reference of independent fiscal institutions include the preparation of estimates and forecasts of the fiscal and macroeconomic consequences of proposed measures in time for consideration by Parliament during the legislative debate and before enactment. Prior to submission of the budget bill, in most countries, the institution produces short-and medium-term no-policy-change forecasts to serve as baselines for subsequent forecasts that incorporate the proposed fiscal measures. In addition,
periodically, it prepares quantitative long-term scenarios and sensitivity analyses for specific policy options, with clearly spelled out macroeconomic and demographic policy assumptions. The forecasts of the independent watchdog are not necessarily more accurate than other official or private forecasts but, unlike the latter, it reports publicly all underlying data and methodology. The goal is to assess the reliability of the government's estimates and forecasts, including the associated assumptions, with a view to determining the sustainability of sovereign debt and gauging the risks associated with the prospects. An additional function in the Netherlands consists of assessing the economic platform of major political parties, at their request, during electoral campaigns. A major issue that emerges in any discussion of independent fiscal institutions is their effectiveness in promoting transparency in public finances. Although in most countries the track record is rather short, on balance they appear to have had a positive impact on both counts. Any evaluation of their effectiveness is clouded by several considerations. Namely, the institution (along with fiscal rules) may be simply a formal manifestation of the government's political commitment, underpinned by the electorate's preference for discipline. In addition, it is difficult to ascertain a more subtle influence of the institution, as fiscal behaviour over time may be conditioned by the mere presence of the institution -whereby the government anticipates, and therefore averts, a potential confrontation by forgoing a more relaxed or opaque fiscal stance. In sum, the main difficulty lies in our inability to observe the counterfactual.
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Technical preparatory work and consensus building are under way in setting up independent fiscal institutions in Australia, Ireland, Portugal and Serbia. In Chile, the 
The experience of Hungary
In many respects, the short-lived experience of Hungary's Fiscal Council illustrates in fast motion the range of challenges faced by an independent fiscal institution in an environment characterised by fiscal indulgence and low policy credibility. Following a rapid gestation period, the Fiscal Council was in operation for nearly two years before its demise and actual termination. 9
Background
Hungary's public finances deteriorated markedly over the period 2000-06. 10 Beset by both time inconsistency and common-pool problems, fiscal performance was dominated primarily by the electoral cycle rather than by macroeconomic fluctuations. From the bursting of the IT bubble at the beginning of the last decade until the global financial crisis, Hungary benefited from sizeable capital inflows to cover its wide external imbalances, driven by low private propensity to save and by large public sector dissaving. During the so-called Great Moderation that experienced abundant global liquidity, these imbalances were facilitated by easy access to financing -especially in the lead up to EU membership.
Under the assumption of an implicit guarantee conferred by EU membership, carry-trader investors were engaged in a moral hazard game, attracted by high yields on government paper. By 2006, the general government deficit peaked at nearly 10% of GDP, the highest among EU member countries.
Despite a fiscal correction as the global financial crisis unraveled, Hungary became exposed to a rapid loss of investor confidence. With a sudden stop in access to the secondary sovereign market, in October 2008, the authorities launched an adjustment programme supported by a stand-by arrangement with the International Monetary Fund and the European Union. Thus, in contrast with the rest of Europe, Hungary's expansionary fiscal stance was followed by the most contractionary stance during the financial crisis. In the meantime, public debt surged to over 80% by the end of 2010 from about 50% of GDP in 2001.
Apart from the destabilising effect on the economy reflected in output volatility and a contraction well below capacity, the greatest damage inflicted by reckless fiscal policy was the sharp erosion in credibility. Low credibility was rooted not only in an actual buildup of public indebtedness, but also in the opaque demeanour of the authorities. Less-thantransparent and incomplete reporting of public accounts (including abuses with PPP projects and delayed recognition of state-owned enterprise losses) and optimistic macrofiscal projections became endemic practices. 
Birth of the Fiscal Council

Goals
Given the economy's continued vulnerability, the overarching goal of the Council from the outset was to restore the credibility of fiscal policy-making in the eyes of the electorate at home and of the financial markets abroad. For this purpose, the Council sought to enforce the new standards of transparency as enshrined in the law. The objective was to ensure public access to timely, comprehensive and understandable information on the state of public finances. This effort involved compelling the government to publish, with sufficient frequency and detail, updates of actual and estimated outcomes of public sector operations -above and beyond the requirements of Eurostat or the commitments under the stand-by arrangement.
Ultimately, the Council aimed at restoring public debt sustainability, in line with the mandate of the fiscal responsibility legislation. Apart from increased transparency, this required continuous surveillance of the reliability of macro-fiscal projections and compliance with the real debt rule and the pay-go rule (discussed in Sub-section 2.7 below), both designed for this purpose. Success would be reflected in a decline in sovereign risk premium. The resulting savings in the government's annual interest bill would total well in excess of EUR 1 billion (more than one percentage point of GDP) if the risk premium declined to the average of Visegrád 11 countries, accompanied by a sizeable decline in interest costs in the private sector as well. More important, the benefits would further induce additional growth over time.
Basic modus operandi
The law provided the Hungarian Fiscal Council with a high degree of independence from both the government and Parliament. To be eligible to become members of the Council, the nominees must not have had any active party affiliation or held a political position in the previous four years. The members' non-renewable tenure was set at nine years -that is, spanning more than two four-year electoral cycles.
The Council was a creation of Parliament and, by the same token, could be abolished by a legislative act. Accordingly, its members were elected, and could be removed with cause, through simple majority vote, as spelled out in the Fiscal Responsibility Law.
Parliament, its committees or members could invite the Council to express its opinions and for consultations; in this sense, Parliament was the Council's primary client. However, the Council was not an integral part of the legislature. Once in office, the Council was entirely independent from Parliament. The only exception was, of course, its annual budgetary appropriation which was in the hands of the legislature. Likewise, the Council was independent from the government and its agencies. The operations, procurement practices and financial activities of the Office of the Fiscal Council, as for any other public institution, were subject to review by the State Audit Office.
During its brief history, the independence of the Council was respected by Parliament and the government. There was no attempt to curtail or influence its activities directly or indirectly, including through its budgetary appropriation, except in the last few weeks of its existence (discussed below). The Council did not co-ordinate, or let alone negotiate, its analysis, forecasts or views with any public or private entity, domestic or foreign. In this respect, the Council could be regarded as a truly independent authority in public finances in Hungary.
Without forfeiting its independence, the Office of the Fiscal Council held technical consultations with the Ministry of Finance, line ministries, the National Bank of Hungary, the Treasury, the Tax and Financial Control Administration, the Government Debt Management Agency, the Central Statistical Office, and other public and private institutions when warranted by its analytical needs. In addition, public institutions were obliged by law to submit (within two weeks upon request) any data to the Council to perform its functions, including confidential data, as confidentiality requirements are binding on the Council as well. The modality of these consultations and data provision was formalised in bilateral agreements signed by the heads of the corresponding institutions. Consultations with the government and data submission by the government met with mixed success, and previously unavailable information was increasingly being released to the Council.
Whether dealing with domestic or foreign entities, the Council maintained an arm'slength distance, as all information released by the Council was being made available to all interested citizens. An exception to this guideline was that, before their official release to the public, all pertinent analyses and communiqués were transmitted by the Chair of the Council to key official counterparts. 12 In addition, the Chair met the counterparts periodically to inform them of the position of the Council on relevant fiscal policy issues.
This practice helped remove unnecessary surprises in the flow of information and promote efficient policy making in economic and financial areas. This practice was particularly important in times of fiscal stress.
The law vested the Chair with decision-making authority in, and responsibility for, the Council, and as chief executive officer of the Office of the Fiscal Council. However, in practice, Council members had opted to take all decisions in consensus (other than day-to-day operational and administrative decisions). This approach enhanced both the efficiency of the Council and the effectiveness of its statements.
Functions: evaluation
The crisis on the real sector -absent a satisfactorily specified financial sector -DSGE models proved to be a robust and versatile basis for macro-fiscal projections and simulations, especially because of the explicit treatment of expectations. 14 At a disaggregate level, the staff prepared real-time estimates of the budgetary effects of all mandatory expenditure programmes and tax categories. These estimates were consistent with the macroeconomic projections and, wherever possible, were supplemented by incorporating behavioural and technical parameters based on econometric estimates and expert opinion. 15 All projections, estimates and underlying methodology were made promptly available to the public on the webpage of the Fiscal Council.
The Council found that the official budgetary forecasts contained in the budget bills were generally more realistic than those in previous years -though subject to a considerable risk margin -even when taking into account the world financial crisis and its impact on activity. The government's overall budgetary forecasts, as well as the underlying macroeconomic assumptions, were found to be broadly compatible with those of the Council. This can be attributed at least in part to the fact that forecasts and assumptions were subject to surveillance by the European Commission and the International Monetary
Fund under the terms of the stand-by arrangement.
However, the medium-term projections released with the 2011 budget bill, submitted to Parliament in November 2010, were deemed by the Fiscal Council to be grossly optimistic, as they were based on an excessive official estimate of the supply-side impact of the introduction of the flat personal income tax rate. In addition, the Fiscal Council pointed to the lack of transparency in the allocation of the assets transferred from the government-mandated defined-contribution pension funds to the traditional definedbenefit public pension scheme.
Functions: compliance with standards and procedures
The Fiscal Responsibility Law of November 2008 constituted a significant step toward transparency in the public accounts and toward strengthening control over government expenditure, effective with the 2010 budget. These innovations included: consolidation of central government operations; reporting accrued losses and profits of majority stateowned enterprises; separation of mandatory budgetary components from discretionary categories; and significant reduction in the scope for expenditure overruns without supplementary appropriation. For the most part, these changes meant a stricter practice than ESA95 standards, with a view to restoring credibility in public finances.
The former Socialist government of Hungary made several attempts to dilute or remove the existing standards in the law. For one thing, the government ignored some of them in the 2010 budget bill. The Council repeatedly called attention to these departures from the law, urging the government to comply. Notwithstanding promises to withdraw some of these proposals, the budget bill was enacted untouched. Only during budget execution has the government shown some willingness to apply the law.
A much more serious breach was a proposed amendment to repeal the obligation to report periodically the losses and gains of state-owned enterprises, at a time when financial scandals were raging in public transport enterprises. The Council's protestations over this matter, which it regarded as totally unacceptable, prompted the Socialist government to rescind support for the proposal. The successor Fidesz 16 government restored the proposed amendment and enacted it, disregarding the views of the Fiscal Council. In the same amendment, the government relaxed the threshold deficit that requires submission of a supplementary budget.
Functions: compliance with fiscal rules
The centrepiece of the fiscal responsibility legislation was to contain the rapid buildup of public indebtedness experienced over the past decade. This objective was to be pursued while preventing the continuation of a pro-cyclical stance that accentuated the volatility of the economic fluctuations. The three major rules are geared to: prevent a deficitgenerating net impact for any single legislative proposal (pay-go rule) in the current and the subsequent year; limit the growth of primary expenditures (expenditure rule); and set a permanent limit on the real stock of central government debt (debt rule). The debt rule limits the stock of central government liabilities, corrected for inflation. To this effect, starting three years in advance, the rule prescribes a two-step algorithm to derive a ceiling on the discretionary primary deficit which serves as the binding operational target, consistent with the ex ante debt limit.
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The law envisaged that compliance with the rules and surveillance would be phased in over time. However, the Council decided to apply the pay-go rule for the purposes of the 2010 budget bill debate. Of some 1 400 proposed amendments submitted by members of Parliament, the Office of the Fiscal Council selected some 300 proposals to examine whether they complied with the rule. Based on the disaggregate methodology being developed, the staff performed estimates (over a three-day interval) of the net budgetary impact and found that the overwhelming majority of the selected proposals violated the rule. A similar exercise was reiterated in connection with amendments to the 2011 budget bill. The estimates and the underlying calculations for each proposal were made available to each MP and to the public. The estimates received considerable media coverage.
Similarly, the Fiscal Council ascertained that both the 2010 and 2011 budget bills were consistent with the expenditure rule. Assessment of compliance with the debt rule was characterised by less than full co-operation from the government in supplying the appropriate information for the separation of mandatory and discretionary components of the budget forecasts. In any event, by flagging the need to comply with the rules, the Council played an early warning role, helping the government to focus on medium-term policy planning and on formulating the necessary fiscal reforms, consistent with the goal of debt sustainability.
Enforcement
As indicated above, during the preliminary debate over the fiscal responsibility bill, there was a clash of views on whether the Council should be endowed with a legally binding instrument of enforcement. In the final version, the law did not give any legally binding enforcement tool to the Council. In fact, the Council had to rely entirely on pressure generated by public opinion and financial markets, as in the case of practically all other existing independent fiscal institutions. Therefore, the primary tool of "enforcement" is communication and dissemination of Council views through various channels. The basic idea is to influence government behaviour through dissuasion rather than coercion. severely eroded, the Council no longer has any specific responsibility for applying criteria of fiscal transparency and sustainability, and for macro-fiscal forecasting or costing of legislative proposals.
Comparison with the United Kingdom
The de facto termination of Hungary's Fiscal Council was striking in light of the recent creation of the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) in the United Kingdom, particularly
given their close resemblance in both structure and terms of reference. 22 The demise of the former and the establishment of the latter provide an interesting illustration of the influence of policy signaling on market expectations. These contemporaneous episodes provide some stylised facts for this purpose, ignoring a myriad of attributes that differentiate the two countries. A feature in common to both countries was the concurrent election in 2010 of a centre-right government, succeeding a centre-left government notorious for fiscal indulgence over an extended period.
In the United Kingdom, shortly after assuming power in May 2010, the new coalition government set an ambitious structural balanced-budget target (called the fiscal mandate)
for the end of its term. In addition, it immediately established an interim OBR, to be succeeded three months later by the permanent OBR headed by a three-member Committee for Budget Responsibility (appointed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but their appointment or attempted dismissal is subject to veto by the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons) and staffed by a team of economists and budget specialists, with a remit that includes real-time assessment of all legislative proposals in the fiscal area. The OBR is responsible for monitoring fulfilment of the mandate, preparing macro-fiscal forecasts (a task taken over from the Treasury) and analysing debt sustainability. In addition, as an initial step toward the mandate, the government introduced a number of tangible policy measures such as pruning welfare entitlements and raising the value-added tax rate.
The new government in Hungary, in command of a two-thirds parliamentary majority, inherited a rules-based fiscal framework which it chose to ignore. The government dismantled several modest structural measures introduced during the IMF/EU-supported adjustment programme, and imposed distortionary asset taxes on selected activities; these actions were followed by amalgamation of defined-contribution government-mandated private pension funds into the traditional defined-benefit pay-as-you-go system. None of these measures contributed to reducing the structural budget deficit. Further, as noted, the government weakened significantly the oversight of fiscal policy by independent institutions (the Constitutional Court, the State Audit Office and the Fiscal Council).
Although the above policy shift had no immediate consequence on macro-fiscal trends, the adopted measures influenced market expectations regarding the medium-to long-term fiscal outlook. Markets reacted promptly to the contrasting policy signals in the two countries, as reflected in long-term interest rate spreads on sovereign paper (Figure 1) which combine currency risk and default risk. In the United Kingdom, sovereign interest rate spreads declined steadily on all maturities. In contrast, in Hungary, following a preelectoral decline in anticipation of the change in government which was expected to break with past behaviour, markets were disappointed, and spreads bounced back sharply to their level at the beginning of the year. The disparity in market perceptions of the credibility of the two governments was even more pronounced in the credit default swap spread on long-term government bonds (Figure 2 ), an indicator of sovereign default risk. 
Lessons for good practices
Independent fiscal institutions are relatively few and of recent vintage. Yet, at least on a tentative basis, the experience accumulated so far can be useful toward formulating an internationally accepted set of good practices. Admittedly, these institutions must be judged within their country-specific context. For this and other reasons, it would be farfetched to promulgate best practices or absolute standards in this area. Subject to this caveat, the following good practices can be identified as being critical for the effectiveness of an independent fiscal institution.
First, the institution must be home-grown and home-owned in every respect. It must address local needs (in particular, lack of transparency and discipline in public finances); also, it must conform to the country's legal framework and political culture. It should not be adapted from abroad or established under pressure from an international or regional authority pursuant to an external commitment. In the event, the local authorities as well as the citizenry are likely to regard the institution as an externally imposed alien body. Indeed, credibility cannot be imported from abroad; it must be based on broad political consensus at home.
Second, the institution must be independent, non-partisan, technically competent, and accountable to the legislature. These characteristics are primarily determined by the professional standing of the leadership of the institution and the manner of its appointment (preferably elected by the legislature). Whereas in a parliamentary system the institution must be independent from both the executive and legislature, in a presidential system independence may be sufficient with respect to the executive branch alone. The governing body must be appropriately remunerated and free from any conflict of interest (both in substance and appearance) and, to strengthen its independence, its tenure should preferably cover more than an electoral cycle and not be renewable. The institution should exercise its independence to the fullest extent possible, as provided by law, and with an adequate level of resources. It should not be inhibited in openly expressing its differences with the government, though unnecessary conflict must be avoided at all times. Whether organisationally embedded in the legislature or not, the institution should stand ready to serve all legislators, but especially the members of the budget or treasury committee, in a non-partisan manner.
Third, the institution can only conduct meaningful surveillance of fiscal policymaking and fulfil its remit with the support of a skilled technical staff and with unlimited access to timely information from the government. The need for competent support staff and a strong mandate to secure access to information is higher if there is a greater degree of opacity in public accounts and official budgetary projections. The staff should be hired through open competition and should not have any links to other public or private institutions. There should not be any impediment in access to government information, though with appropriate safeguards (that is, security clearance for staff) for protection of state secrets in the areas of national defence and security.
Fourth, the core remit of the institution should consist of assessments of fiscal stance and debt sustainability -including monitoring compliance with fiscal rules or targets, if any -through real-time evaluation of the budgetary effects of all legislative proposals. This involves preparation of pre-budget baseline (no policy change) macro-fiscal forecasts, to be followed by forecasts upon submission of the budget bill, as well as costing of the effects of major legislative proposals. Periodically, this should be supplemented with computation of numerical long-term scenarios, based on prudent macroeconomic and demographic assumptions. All quantitative estimates and forecasts should be made publicly available (in time for the legislative debate and well ahead of enactment), along with a full account of the underlying data and methodology. Surveillance by the institution should in no way overlap or duplicate the monitoring task of the national audit office; in fact, the tasks of the two institutions are complementary. Furthermore, the remit of the independent fiscal institution should preclude any policy-making or normative responsibility, and care should be taken in conducting any advisory role in a strictly non-partisan manner.
Fifth, a newly created independent fiscal institution must identify itself and start operating according to its terms of reference as soon as possible. This is the first and most important step toward establishing a reputation and gaining public support, because "cement dries quickly". It cannot be taken for granted that the role and attributes of the new institution will be readily understood, its non-partisanship trusted, or its beneficial effects recognised without proof. Speed in implementation is all the more important since, in order to gain respectability and protection from threats to its existence, the institution's non-partisanship must be tested over at least two electoral cycles, possibly covering governments of different political orientation.
Lastly, the institution must develop effective communication channels very early, especially with the media. Given that the institution can only have influence over fiscal policy-making through dissuasion (rather than through coercion by means of legal sanctions or other punitive measures), it must avail itself of media outlets which in turn can help foster an informed constituency (and financial markets) that will exercise timely pressure on the government to behave transparently and responsibly and thus build credibility. Ultimately, in a free society, the media are the closest allies and promoters of the institution.
Notes
timely monitoring of compliance with the [numerical fiscal] rules based on reliable and independent analysis carried out by independent bodies or bodies endowed with functional autonomy vis-à-vis the fiscal authorities of member states."
9. For a detailed discussion of the Hungarian experience, see Kopits and Romhányi (forthcoming) .
10. See Berger, Kopits and Székely (2007) for an analysis of fiscal indulgence in Central Europe prior to EU accession.
11. The Visegrád Group, or Visegrád Four (V4), are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic. Originally, these four countries entered into an agreement in 1991 to co-ordinate their policies with a view to apply for membership in the EU.
12. These official counterparts are the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance, the Governor of the National Bank of Hungary, and the Chair of Parliament's Budget and Finance Committee.
13. Actually, assessment of the effects of any legislative proposal -including motions for amendment -on discretionary items is an option rather than an obligation. However, as a means of protecting local governments from unfunded mandates imposed by the central government, constrained by the new set of fiscal rules, the Council was required to assess the impact of legislative proposals on the fiscal position of local governments.
14. The importance of expectations cannot be overstated in an analysis of the effects of fiscal policy. It is well known that the same fiscal measure can even have opposite effects if agents expect them to prevail permanently or only transitorily. In the presence of fiscal rules, the effects depend crucially on public expectations about the actual nature and time path of the authorities' fiscal and monetary reaction functions.
15. In essence, this is tantamount to so-called dynamic scoring (see Auerbach, 2004) .
16. Fidesz (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége) is a major right-wing conservative party in Hungary, founded in 1988.
17. Whereas the ultimate targets under policy rules are often understood easily by interested citizens, the actual linkage to operational targets is not always obvious. In this regard, some fiscal rules, particularly the debt rule, are comparable to prevailing monetary rules. For instance, in an inflation-targeting regime, the target inflation rate is widely understood, and the difference between the target and the actual rate is tracked by the non-specialised media, but the transmission mechanism between the base interest rate and the inflation target can be followed only by a specialist in monetary economics.
18. Absent a precedent and because of the fragile economic situation, the President of the Republic decided not to exercise this option for the 2010 budget bill, even though the latter contravened the Fiscal Responsibility Law, as discussed.
19. In addition to exhortations in the press, the heads of independent fiscal institutions in Sweden, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands (Calmfors, Chote and Teulings, 2010 ) signed a letter urging the Hungarian government not to weaken the Council. In Hungary, more than 700 university faculty, researchers and public figures signed a petition to withdraw the government proposal.
20. Given his close affiliation to the Fidesz party and as head of an insurance company, the nonpartisanship of the current Chair is questionable on conflict-of-interest grounds.
21. Oddly enough, the new constitution instructs the Council to ascertain whether the budget bill is in compliance with a new rule limiting public debt to one-half of GDP. Further, it authorises the Constitutional Court to reject the budget law if it fails to approximate this ceiling -at a time when public debt exceeds 80% of GDP.
22. There were a number of contacts regarding the establishment of the Office for Budget Responsibility between Hungary's Fiscal Council and the United Kingdom authorities, both in Budapest (including during a visit by 14 members of the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons in December 2009) and in London, culminating in a request for submission of evidence by the Chair of the Fiscal Council (see House of Commons, 2010) .
